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A Critical Exposition of the Hidden-Indexical Theory
Rodrigo Jungmann de CastroUniversidade Federal de Sergipe
Abstract:  In this essay, I begin by highlighting the main features of the so-called ‘Hidden-Indexical Theory of Belief Reports,’ by focusing on the work of some of its leading proponents. In order to bring to light the very serious difficulties faced by the aforementioned theory, I subsequently go on to discuss Marga Reimer’s attempt to defend the theory against the sharp criticisms leveled by Stephen Schiffer. I will provide reasons for concluding that Reimer’s defense is unsuccessful.
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Resumo: Neste artigo, principiamos com uma visão geral das características básicas da chamada ‘Teoria do Indexical Oculto’, enfocando a obra de alguns de seus mais destacados proponentes. Para trazer à luz as dificuldades muito sérias enfrentadas pela teoria supracitada, passamos em seguida a discutir a tentativa empreendida por Marga Reimer no sentido de defender a teoria das agudas críticas de Stephen Schiffer. Serão dadas razões para concluirmos que a defesa feita por Reimer não é  bem-sucedida.
Palavras-chave:  Atribuições  de  Crenças.  Referência  Direta.  Constituição  Não-Articulada
I
A  quote  from  Recanati  (1993)  may  help  us  see  some  of   the  theoretical choices available to philosophers in connection with propositional attitude reports:
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Frege’s Puzzle:
(A) If two referential terms t and t’ refer to the same object, and if two simple sentences “P” and “Q” differ only in that t occurs in “P” and t’ occurs in “Q” , then “P” and “Q” express the same proposition.(B) If “P” and “Q” express the same proposition, then “John believes that P” and “John believes that Q” express the same proposition.(C) Yet: In some contexts at least , “John believes that P” and “John believes that Q” do not express the same proposition even though (i) “P” and “Q” differ only in that t occurs in “P” and t’ occurs in “Q”, and (ii) t and t’ refer to the same object. (Recanati, 1993, p. 348)
The author goes on to note that Frege’s solution consisted in dropping (A).  This is certainly the case on the interpretation that equates Fregean thoughts with propositions.  Now,  (A)  is  at  the  very  core  of  the  direct-reference  view  of propositional content, as  put forward by Kaplan and Perry, among others. If (B) is true, we had better drop (C), which had seemed to be forced on us by the empirical  datum  of  opacity,  and  maintain,  with  Nathan  Salmon  (1986),  that,  contrary  to appearances, “John believes that P” and “John believes that Q” are bound to express the same proposition. The fact that most of us have overpowering intuitions to the effect that (C) is true has led some direct-reference theorists to maintain that there is something wrong with (B). Support for (B) is  anchored on a certain view of meaning compositionality for  natural languages. On one natural interpretation,  if meaning compositionality is a basic feature of natural languages,   the meaning of a sentence  is a function of  the meanings of its component parts, along with their syntactical arrangement.It is arguably the case that any natural language is compositional to a large extent. Compositionality offers us a plausible explanation for our unlimited capacity to understand sentences we never heard before. We can understand them by virtue of knowing the meanings of their component words and the grammatical rules of 
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our language. No less importantly, it could also be proffered as an explanation for our capacity to produce novel sentences – sentences no one has ever  uttered before.A likely corollary of a meaning compositionality principle is that the meaning of a sentence should be preserved if words are replaced by co-referring expressions. If we consider such sentence pairs as (1) “John believes that George Orwell was a great writer” and (2) “John believes that Eric Arthur Blair was a great writer”,  we seem bound, on a direct reference view, to take them to express a relation – the belief relation – obtaining  between John and the singular proposition containing Orwell/Blair and the property “being a great writer”. With the same relation holding between the same relata, Salmon and others find no alternative but to claim that the same proposition is expressed by (1) and (2). Direct-reference  theorists  who  challenge  (B),  for  their  part,  are  keen  on emphasizing  the  limitations  of  the  above  construal  of  meaning  compositionality.  They would have us believe that there is more to the semantics of (1) and (2) than meets the eye – or the ear. The Hidden Indexical Theory, or HIT, for short, so-called for reasons to be explained below, emerged out of their efforts. While one might be willing to renounce  the claim that natural languages are strictly compositional, this has not been the line taken by HIT theorists. They are  happy to  say  that  a  proposition  is  a  structured  entity,  whose  individuation  is  a function  of  its  component  parts  and  the  nature  of  their  arrangement.  Their disagreement with theorists like Salmon rests on their willingness to explore the possibilities  of a view of compositionality that  is both more liberal than the one explicitly employed by Salmon and independently plausible as part of a description of the workings of natural language. As Crimmins (1992) points out, compositionality need not go hand in hand with what he calls “full articulation’ (op. cit. p. 9)  If compositionality were to entail full articulation, the component parts of a proposition would  in every case be the 
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content  of   some  subsentential   expression  contained  in  the  sentence  which expresses  the  proposition  in  question.  Now,   on  the  direct  reference  view,  the content of both ‘George Orwell’ and ‘Eric Arthur Blair’ in (1) and (2)  above – what the names contribute to the propositions  expressed by (1) and (2) – is   just the man himself.  Moreover,   (1)  and  (2)  do  not  differ  in  any  other  way  as  far  as   their linguistic expression is concerned.  This being the case, on the view that takes belief  ascriptions to express relations between a believer and proposition believed, full articulation would ensure that the same proposition is expressed by (1) and (2).But if compositionality is not necessarily fully articulated, it might be the case that the semantic make-up of (1) is not the same as that of (2). The propositions expressed by (1) and (2) could differ in virtue of including a component which is not  the content of any expression in the linguistic surface of the sentences expressing those propositions.  As we will see in the next section, it is arguably the case that a  natural language like English is not in general constrained by the demands of full  articulation. As we shall have ample occasion to see, HIT theorists make essential use of this fact.
II 
In this section I am concerned to present a brief statement of the  Hidden- Indexical Theory, which was put  forward in somewhat different forms by Schiffer (1977, 1992), Crimmins and Perry (1989) and Crimmins (1992). In the next section,  
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I  will  have a little  more to say on a crucial  distinction between two of its  most  representative implementations.1 / 2  Strictly speaking, HIT is best thought of as comprising a family of theories. I cannot  hope  to  do  full  justice  to  the  complexity  of  the  views  of  its  individual  proponents. I am not particularly troubled by this. For, even though the individual theories are highly  complex, my rejection of them – to which Section IV is devoted –  is based on rather  simple ideas, which I take to constitute powerful grounds for  rejecting all such theories – however elaborately developed. In Section V, I will have a  look  at  Marga  Reimer’s    interesting  defense  of  the  Hidden-Indexical  Theory against  what  I,  along with Stephen Schiffer,  regard as  the  theory’s  most  serious problem. I  believe that some important lessons may be learned from a look into these   authors’ disagreement.While all HIT theorists are   decidedly anti-Fregean in including  both direct reference  and  semantic  innocence  among  their  desiderata,  they   resort  to  a theoretical move that is  reminiscent of Frege’s. The basic idea is that ascriptions like (1) and (2) do not only contain references to the believer and what he believes,  the  singular  proposition  that  is  the  content  of  the  belief,  but  also,  as  a  third argument in a triadic belief relation,  how the proposition is believed, the mode of presentation under which it is believed.3 
1 Mark Richard (1990) and François Recanati (1993) espouse similar views, but I hesitate to include them squarely in the HIT camp. Richard advances the bold claim that the verb ‘believe’ is itself an  indexical, while Recanati’s views are fairly close to those of Perry and Crimmins. He departs from  them in taking ‘believes that’ to express a dyadic relation between the agent of the belief and a  quasi-singular proposition said to be both the content of the belief and the reference of the ‘that’-clause.  Such a  quasi-singular proposition itself contains the contextually determined mode of presentation tacitly referred to. Although Recanati’s theory would seem to be immune to criticisms of  one of the  main difficulties of  HIT, namely its contention that  ‘believes that’ expresses a triadic relation, it  seems hard to square it with semantic innocence.
2 Schiffer, as we will see shortly,  later came to be highly skeptical of HIT. 
3 As  we will  see,  Schiffer (1992) thinks that the best conceivable version of HIT introduces tacit references to  mode of presentation  types.   For reasons to be explained below, Crimmins (1992) avoids the mode of presentation idiom, while still holding that belief ascription sentences contain  references to “ways of believing,” thought of as concrete cognitive   particulars. 
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The  datum  of  opacity  would  thus  be  accounted  for:  one  might  believe, disbelieve or suspend judgment on the same singular proposition  when  taking it in different ways,  determined by the context of utterance and implicitly referred to. On this view, the semantics of belief ascriptions is similar to that of sentences like (3) “It’s raining”. No explicit reference to a location is provided in (3). Still, if someone were to utter (3), the context of utterance normally suffices to determine the proposition he intended to express.  The location where it is raining is, in the  words  of  Crimmins  and  Perry  (1989)  and  Crimmins  (1992),  an  unarticulated  
constituent of the proposition expressed by (3) in a given context. It is unarticulated on account of the fact that there is no term in the linguistic surface of (3) carrying an explicit reference to a location. On this view, (3) expresses in elliptic form the same proposition that might be expressed by (4) “It’s  raining here” or (5) “It’s raining there”. Just as one might say that there is an unexpressed, hidden indexical in (3),  whose reference is contextually determined, so too,  the Hidden-Indexical Theory claims,  the  modes  of  presentation  specifying  the  how  of  the  belief  relation   in ascriptions  like  (1)  and  (2)  might  be  expressed,  even  in  the  absence  of  words actually carrying the burden of referring to those modes of presentation – which  is why the reference is said to be  hidden  – and in a way that is dependent on the context – which  is why  the reference is likened to that of indexicals.In the preceding paragraph, I said that for HIT theorists reference to modes of presentation is hidden, but only  likened  it to that of indexicals. I believe that a certain  amount  of  caution  is  necessary  here,  lest  we  mistakenly  identify  the implicitly  referred  to  modes  of  presentation  championed  by  HIT  theorists  with anything  too  similar  to  indexicals  themselves.  Sentence  (3)  above  has  as  an unarticulated constituent a location, which can be supplied as in (4) and (5) with sentences  containing  the  spatial  indexicals  ‘here’  or  ‘there’.  But  unarticulated constituency is, in general, not confined to such cases. 
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Thus, if one were to say that (6) “Mary walked to the edge of the cliff and  jumped”, the implicit unarticulated constituent in the proposition expressed by (6), at least in most contexts of utterance, is no doubt “from the cliff”, not an indexical.  Similarly, in (7) “Joe’s point was not relevant,” the unarticulated constituent is likely to be something like “to the issue we are discussing,” or some such thing. Another reason why the comparison with indexicals  should be taken with a grain of  salt emerges from a consideration of sentences like (8) “Robert’s book was a delight to read.” The proposition expressed by (8) in a given context could be that the book written by Robert was a delight to read or that the book owned by Robert was a delight to read or even that someone was delighted to read a certain book, a copy of which he plans to buy for Robert. In contrast with indexicals like ‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’,  expressions like ‘Robert’s book’  are not associated with a fixed rule that determines for any token of the expression a reference picked out by that token. Thus, while (9) “I am very rich” is true in every case if the speaker – the person uttering (9) – is rich, (10)  “Robert’s  book  was  stolen”  may  be  true  or  false,  depending  on  what  the reference of ‘Robert’s book’ is. No fixed rule tells us what the reference of ‘Robert’s  book’ is; only the context does. This is the reason why Recanati (1993) insists on distinguishing the genuine indexicality of words like ‘I’ and ‘you’ from the  sort of semantic underdetermination exhibited by other linguistic expressions. Now, in the case  of  belief  ascriptions,  there  is  no  fixed  rule  whereby  the  reference  to  the relevant mode of presentation is determined. What is more, there is not even a rule which  of  itself  determines  whether   a  belief  ascription  of  the  general  form  ‘a believes that b is F’ is to be read de dicto or de re. The overall context of utterance is to be taken into account.  Thus,  it  would seem to make better sense for the HIT theorist to claim  that belief ascriptions are semantically  underdetermined rather than  indexical in nature.
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In any case,  HIT theorists   have called our attention to an important and interesting  fact  about  natural  language.  The  phenomenon  of  unarticulated constituency would appear to give us  good enough grounds to conclude that the semantics of English is not fully articulated. Not every propositional constituent that a  proposition  is  comprised  of  is  necessarily  the  content  of  some  word  in  the linguistic  surface of  the  sentence which expresses the proposition. 4But, if full articulation is rejected, this at least opens up the possibility that there might be some additional feature – one that is not linguistically encoded – in the propositional content of  ascriptions like (1) “John believes that George Orwell  was a great writer” and (2) “John believes that Eric Arthur Blair was a great writer.”  A difference as  regards this extra semantic constituent  could be taken to explain the possibly mismatched truth-values of (1) and (2).
III
The earliest statement of the Hidden-Indexical Theory was, as far as I know, provided by Schiffer (1977). After a period of seeming dormancy, it was revived by Crimmins and Perry (1989). Their version of HIT is more elaborately developed by Crimmins (1992), who devoted a whole book to its defense.As far as history goes, it seems safe to say  that mounting dissatisfaction with Salmon’s pragmatic approach was a decisive factor in HIT’s  revival.  It  should be noted  that  John  Perry  himself  was  once  among  those  who  supported  a  view reminiscent of Salmon’s. But as Perry himself acknowledges in a postscript to ‘The Prince and the Phone Booth’, his breaking ranks with the Implicature theorists owed 
4 I  am  hedging  a  bit  because  not  every  interpreter  is  happy  with  the  arguments  in  support  of unarticulated constituency. Bach (1994) hints at the possibility that no proposition at all is expressed  by  sentences  like  “It’s  raining”,   though  the  possibility  exists  that  a  proposition  might  be  pragmatically  conveyed by a mechanism he elsewhere calls  ‘conversational impliciture’,  whereby  what the speaker means and communicates is a restricted version of what he literally says. 
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a great deal to  Crimmins’ arguments against “biting the bullet”  after the fashion suggested by Salmon.The phenomenon of unarticulated constituency now offered a way out to the singular propositions theorist who, being unwilling to bite any bullets in response to the Fregean, is keen on respecting ordinary intuitions concerning truth values. It now seemed clear that the singular propositions theorist is not ipso facto forced to maintain  that, contrary to all appearances, the same proposition is expressed by belief ascription sentences like (1) and (2) above. Accordingly, Perry and Crimmins’  work,  which culminated in  their  1989  paper,  treats  referential  opacity as a  real phenomenon,  rather  than as  a  persistent  illusion  to   be  explained  away  on  the pragmatic level.In its appeal to contextual factors pertaining to the context of utterance of  belief ascription sentences, HIT is of course still ‘pragmatic’ in an important sense, but, as Perry and Crimmins write in their concluding paragraph, “it is a mistake to  relegate  pragmatics  to  matters  of  felicity  and  implicature.  In  the  case  of  belief  reports, it is central to understanding content and truth” (op. cit.  p. 278).  In that broad  sense  in  which  ‘pragmatic’  means  roughly  the  same  as  ‘contextual,’  the proposition  expressed  by  someone’s  uttering  (3)  “It’s  raining”  is  no  doubt pragmatically  determined.  But,  of  course,  utterances  of  (3)  may express  distinct propositions as uttered by different speakers. Some of these would be true, while others would be false.Similarly, while the  how  of the belief relations expressed by (1) and (2) is contextually, and to that extent, pragmatically, determined,  this is not to deny that the  relevant  ways  of  believing   may,  in  each  case,  be   full-fledged  semantic constituents of the propositions expressed by these sentences. 
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Disagreements  among  HIT  theorists  tend  to  revolve  around  how  best  to incorporate such ways of believing, or modes of presentation, in the semantics of belief ascriptions. The accounts  advocated  by Crimmins and Schiffer are representative of a significant split among HIT theorists.5 There is a fundamental disagreement as to how intimately close  belief reporters are to the modes of presentation under which a singular proposition may be believed. On Crimmins’  view,  modes  of  presentation  –  though  actually  he  adopts another terminology – are themselves the objects of tacit reference. This is how modes of presentation are brought to bear – on Crimmins’ view – on the solution of Frege’s puzzle. Crimmins would have it that in the sentence pair 
(1) John believes that George Orwell was a great writer;(2) John believes that Eric Arthur Blair was a great writer.
both the names ‘George Orwell’ and ‘Eric Arthur Blair’ have as their reference the man himself – even as they occur inside the indirect ‘that’-clause. It bears recalling that according to Frege a name’s reference in an indirect context is its customary sense in an ordinary, direct context. Thus, the references of ‘George Orwell’ and ‘Eric Arthur Blair’ are said to be distinct in (1) and (2). Since such an option is not open to a  direct  reference  theorist  like  Crimmins,  he  is  bound  to  incorporate  modes  of presentation differently in his solution of Frege’s puzzle. He does so by claiming that  references are made in (1) and (2) to particular, and distinct, modes of presentation, 
5 Actually, Schiffer (1992) offers a conditional defense of the Hidden-Indexical Theory. HIT, he claims,  is  that  best  theory  of  belief  ascriptions  on  the  assumption  that  a  natural  language  like  English  possesses a “correct compositional truth theory” (op. cit. p. 499). Because HIT is powerless against a number of objections Schiffer goes on to address in that same article, he denies that English has a  compositional truth theory.
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even though such modes of presentation are in no way made explicit and only tacitly referred to.Crimmins’ own take on belief reports is indissolubly linked to his views on belief  as  a  topic  in  the  philosophy of  mind.  Particular  instances  of  believing,  he holds, are individuated not only by the content of the belief – a proposition – but  also by the way in which it  is believed. For reasons that need not concern us here, Crimmins claims that such  ways of believing themselves cannot be individuated by anything  as  coarse-grained  as  a  Fregean mode  of  presentation  or  a  belief  state. Instead, they are said to be concrete cognitive particulars in people’s minds and,  therefore, irreducibly agent-bound.  A  way  of  believing,  according  to  Crimmins,  is  made  up  of  “the  concrete particular representations employed by the agent to represent objects, properties and relations  the  proposition is  about”  (op.  cit.  p.  100).  Specifically,  whenever  a singular proposition is the content of a belief, the representation of the object the proposition  is  about  what  Crimmins  calls  a  ‘notion’  of  that  object,  whereas  the representations of properties and relations go by the technical term ‘ideas.’ While Crimmins’  ways  of  believing  are  responsible  for  representing  the  semantic components  that  a  singular  proposition is  comprised of,  they do not  satisfy any publicity requirement as Fregean modes of presentation are expected to do. And, yet, these agent-bound ways of believing are, on Crimmins’ view, routinely referred to by belief ascribers.  Crimmins’  particularistic  take  on  the  entities  supposed  to  specify  how  a singular proposition is believed is  interestingly  criticized by Bach (1993).  Bach argues that even if Crimmins is right in supposing that instances of believing – the reality of  which make belief  reports true – are to be individuated by particular cognitive representations, it does not follow that such representations are part of what the report is about. 
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Bach draws our attention to an  interesting analogy with what he informally calls ‘running reports’.6 If one were to say that (11) “Bill ran to work today” – the example is Bach’s –, the report is no doubt true if there was an instance of running to work by Bill on the day in question. If, for simplicity, we assume that Bill ran to work only once on that  day, it  is no doubt correct to say that (11) is true because of  a particular  instance of running to work by Bill. In fact, we can say that Bill ran to work on that day in some particular way  x, the specification of which fully describes the instance of running which is behind the truth reported by  (11).  However, it evidently does not follow that  (9) is  short  for (11)`  “Bill  ran to work today in a  particular  way  x.”  For  (11)  would  be  just  as  true  if  Bill  had  run  to  work  in  a particular way y, say, at a different time of the day or by a different route. Intuitively, the person responsible for issuing the report would not take himself to have uttered a  falsehood,  should he  realize  that  he  was in  error  about  the  way in  which the running took place. Instead, the content of the report is wholly indifferent to any of  the possible ways Bill might have run to work on the day on which the report was made. So, it seems clear that there is no hidden reference to some particular way of  running in an utterance of (11).In much the same way, it sounds decidedly implausible to suggest that (12) “Joe believes that Bill  ran to work today” covertly expresses what could be more fully stated as (12)` “Joe believes that Bill ran to work today in a particular  way x,” where x fully specifies Joe’s particular notion of Bill, his idea of running and so on.  For (12) would be just as true if Joe believed that Bill ran to work on that same day in some other particular way y, involving other of his notions of Bill and his ideas of running and so forth.This particular difficulty is avoided in Schiffer’s favored version of HIT. On Schiffer’s account, there is no actual reference to a particular mode of presentation. 
6 In what follows, I offer a rather free adaptation of Bach’s argument.
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Instead, modes of presentation are merely quantified over, while actual reference is to  a  mode of  presentation  type,  thought  of  as  a  property the  relevant  modes of presentation are supposed to meet. Such a property imposes a restriction on the domain of quantification which the variable m, representing a mode of presentation, ranges over. In Schiffer’s notation, the logical form of an ascription like (13) “Ralph believes  that  Fido  is  a  dog”   is  given  by  (13)`  (m)   (  Φ*m  &  B(Ralph,  <Fido, doghood>, m)), where the belief relation takes as arguments Ralph, the ordered pair representing the singular proposition that Fido is a dog and a mode of presentation 
m satisfying property Φ*. To achieve some understanding of the  property Φ* a mode of presentation is supposed  to  satisfy  on  Schiffer’s  account,  it  helps  to  turn  our  attention  to ascriptions such  as (14) “Nabuchadnezzar believes that Phosphorus is beautiful” and (15) “Nabuchadnezzar believes that Hesperus is beautiful.” For   (14) to be true, on  Schiffer’s  view,  it  is  necessary  that  Nabuchadnezzar  believe  the  singular proposition made up of Phosphorus/Hesperus and the property “being beautiful” not just under any mode of presentation, as Salmon would have it, but under a mode of presentation requiring that   Nabuchadnezzar  think of the object in question as a bright star seen in the morning before sunrise. Similarly, (15) is true provided that there  is  some  mode  of  presentation  of  Phosphorus/Hesperus  requiring  that Nabuchadnezzar think of that celestial body as a bright star seen in the evening after sunset. Regrettably, difficulties abound for HIT regardless of whether one resorts to references  to  concrete  modes of  presentation or,  more cautiously,  to  a  property modes of presentation are expected to satisfy. These are difficulties I address in the next section.
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IV
Some of  the less obvious difficulties for HIT are of a somewhat technical nature.  I  will  be  concerned  with  one  such  difficulty.   Schiffer  (1992) 7 presents arguments against  the view that  ‘believes that’  can be defensibly construed as a triadic relation, with a mode of presentation filling in one of the three argument slots.  As Schiffer notes, the triadic relations encountered in ordinary language are such that their three-placedness is often made quite explicit. A verb like ‘give,’ by its very nature, would seem to express  one such relation. In all instances of giving,  
something is given by someone to someone else. The three-placedness of ‘giving’ is on display in a sentence like (16) “Mary gave her daughter 2, 000 dollars”. In contrast,  one would be hard put to find ordinary language counterparts of (16), where the alleged three-placedness of ‘believes that’ is similarly in the open. Needless to say, it  would be question-begging to come up with examples along the lines of  (17) “Ralph believes that Fido is a dog in way w / under mode of presentation m”.8 Loaded as they are with in-built  technical  jargon,  sentences like (17) can hardly be proffered in support of the very thesis  the HIT theorist is concerned to advance.9   But, as I see it, the most important difference  between the triadic relations expressed by verbs like ‘give’, ‘lend’, ‘borrow’ and so forth and the allegedly three-place relation expressed by ‘believes that’  is  clearly to be seen when we look at sentences such as  (18) “John was given a book,” (19) “Jackie lent the money,” and (20) “Rick borrowed from Sue”. In all of (18), (19), and (20), we get a sense that we are missing essential information.  It is exceedingly natural that someone should ask “Who gave the book to John?,” “To whom did Jackie lend the money?” and “What did 7 The discussion in this section is heavily indebted to Schiffer. However, I will allow myself to give it  some twists of my own.
8 The example is Schiffer’s (Schiffer, 1992). 
9 As we will see shortly, some examples in  Reimer (1996) might be construed as sentences in which  modes of presentation are explicitly expressed in plain ordinary language.  
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Rick borrow from Sue?”.  The arguments that are   missing from (18), (19) and (20)  answer questions we are naturally compelled to ask if we want to know what states of affairs  are responsible  for the truths that might be expressed by such sentences. For (18) to be true it is necessary that John was given the book by someone or other. For (19) to be true, it is necessary that Jackie lent the money to  some particular  
person or persons. Similarly, the fact  that something was borrowed by Rick from Sue underwrites the truth one might express by uttering (20).  Of course, if we are told that (21) “Helen gave the book to John”, that (22) “Jackie lent the money to Rose”  and  that  (23)  “Rick  borrowed  a  thousand  dollars  from  Sue”,  we  might  be additionally informed that Helen gave the book to John with a smile, that Jackie lent the money to Rose against her will and that Rick borrowed a thousand dollars from Sue  with no intention of paying  her back.  While we may ask for and receive the additional  information conveyed  by  the  words  italicized above,   they  are  not essential to the state of affairs responsible for the truths incompletely expressed by (18),  (19)  and  (20)  and  more  fully   expressed  by  (21),  (22)  and  (23).  These sentences would still be true, if, counterfactually,  Helen gave the book to John with 
a frown,  Jackie lent the money to Rose willingly and  Rick borrowed the money from Sue with every intention of paying  her back soon. It is clear that the words in italics are not properly to be thought  as logical arguments in the relations at issue  but simply as incidental adverbial qualifications. 10Here we encounter a striking difference between ‘give’, ‘lend’ and ‘borrow’ and  ‘believes  that’.  If  one  were  to  advance  the  supposition  that,  contrary  to appearances,  the  verbs   ‘give’,  ‘lend’  and  ‘borrow’  express  dyadic  relations,  the readiness with which we could pose questions for which the missing arguments would give us the answers would easily prove the supposition wrong.
10 I believe that my way of addressing this issue gives us a more natural criterion of argumenthood than Schiffer’s. For him, an argument, unlike an adverbial qualifier, can answer a ‘whether’-question,  such as “To whom did you wonder whether Mary gave the house?” (Schiffer, 1992, pp. 518-19).
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In contrast, if we were to suppose, for the sake of argument,  that  ‘believes that’ expresses a dyadic relation between a believer and the singular proposition believed, we would  not get a sense that (1) “John believes that George Orwell was a  great writer”, as it stands, is informationally incomplete and that it really calls for supplementation along the  lines of  (1)`  “John believes  that  George Orwell  was a great writer in way w / under mode of presentation m”, where the implicitly referred to modes of presentation are made explicit.   The assumption that  ‘believes   that’  expresses  a  dyadic  relation  is  not  incoherent  because  we  are  not  in  the  least compelled  to  ask  “In  what  way or  under  what  mode  of  presentation  does  John believe that George Orwell was a great writer?”.  Even if we leave aside the technical  ‘mode  of  presentation’  idiom  and  stick  to  the  simpler  “In  what  way  does  John believe that George Orwell was a great writer?,” it is not at all hard to see that this is  not the sort of ordinary language question anyone would ever feel compelled to ask if  we  want  to  know what  state  of  affairs  is  responsible  for  the  truth  we  might express  in  uttering  (1)  “John  believes  that  George  Orwell  was  a  great  writer.”  Sentence (1) may express a truth  regardless  of the particular way in which John might accept  the proposition which could be expressed by (24) “George Orwell was a great writer.”  If implicitly referred to modes of presentation somehow make it into the semantics of belief ascriptions, they are not arguments of the ‘believes that’ relation.  At  best,  they  could  amount  to  elliptical  adverbial  qualifiers.   In  what follows, I will argue that even this much is very doubtful.As far as I can see, the most powerful argument against the Hidden-Indexical Theory  is  one that  is  not  particularly  technical.  Its  force  is  vividly  apparent  to Schiffer (1992) and criticized by Reimer (1996).  The greatest problem for HIT is that  it   is  psychologically  highly  implausible  to  suggest  that  ascribers  of propositional attitudes are aware of any  referential intentions involving   modes of presentation or types of such modes. A person who uttered  (1) “John believes that  
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George Orwell was a great writer” would be hard put to say under what mode of presentation of George Orwell – and  of the property “being a great writer” – John believes the singular proposition that George Orwell was a great writer. In fact, such a person would normally lack the very idea of   modes of presentation. In saying that  ascribers make implicit  reference to modes of  presentation,  thought  of  either as types or concrete particulars, HIT theorists seem forced to say that belief ascribers,  mostly nonphilosophers, invariably make reference to entities whose very existence they remain entirely unaware of. It  might  be  countered  that  ‘mode  of  presentation’  is  a  technical  notion, mastery of which it would be ludicrous to attribute to non-philosophers. But that is  hardly any help for the HIT theorist. We might opt to use less technical language and say that what is said by (1) is that (1) ` “John believes that George Orwell was a great  writer in some particular way w ”. Even thus amended, it is still the case that belief ascribers do not seem to be conscious of making any tacit references to such  ways of believing. And things get worse. The difficulty is not simply that belief ascribers are  not aware of the meaning intentions predicted by the Hidden-Indexical Theory.  If  an ascriber is  asked  what he meant when saying that  (1) “John believes that George Orwell  was  a  great  writer,”  he  will  predictably  say  that  all  he  meant,  all  he  is conscious of meaning, is that John believes that George Orwell was a great writer. In Schiffer’s words: 
One  trouble  with  the  tacit-intention  proposal  [of  HIT]  is  that  it induces a rather radical  error theory:  not  only do ordinary belief ascribers have no conscious knowledge of what they are asserting, they also turn out not  to have the conscious thoughts they think they have.  (Schiffer, 1992, p. 515)
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Moreover, we should pause to recall how the situation thus created contrasts with  the  clear-cut  cases  of  unarticulated  constituency  which  the  HIT  theorist appeals to in his effort to make his views initially plausible. Anyone who uttered a sentence like  (3) “It’s raining” typically has a clear sense of just what he intended to express, namely that it is raining at one particular place or other, and could, upon request,  easily  make  the  intended  reference  to  a  location  known  to  others.  As Schiffer  (1995)  points  out,  in  the  ‘paradigmatic’  instances  of  tacit  reference exemplified by (3) the speaker has no trouble whatsoever  in recognizing that the statement contains a reference to some  location.11Therefore, thinking of belief ascription sentences along the lines suggested by a consideration of sentences like (3) might amount to  little more than having recourse to a misleading analogy. As we shall see in what follows, Reimer makes an attempt at rescuing HIT from Schiffer’s criticisms. Although I am not convinced  by her arguments, I believe that the contrast between her position and Schiffer’s is well worth looking into.
11 I  wrote ‘typically’  because it might be objected that a speaker’s referential  intentions need not always  be  fully  determinate.  One  of  Reimer’s  examples  should  make  this  clear.  As  a  resident  of Tucson, Arizona, she could say on a torrid summer day that “It sure is hot.” Reimer’s tacit intention to  refer  to  a  location  might  be  indeterminate  in  that  she  might  not  recognize  herself  as  having  determinately meant that it is hot in  Tucson,  as opposed, to, say,  Central Tucson  or even  Southern  
Arizona,  although she could see herself as having tacitly, and indeterminately, referred to all such locations.  Schiffer (1995) admits as much  and argues that the strongest possible version of HIT  would similarly predict that belief ascribers  make tacit,  indeterminate reference to a plurality of types of modes of presentation. The reason for this is that it is not clear that modes of presentation  should  satisfy  a  single,  well  defined  property.  While  such  twists    add  considerably  to    HIT’s complexity, we need not be concerned in what follows with this amended version of the theory. For  the amendments do not help in any way with the main difficulty faced by HIT, namely that ascribers are not aware of making tacit references to (types of ) modes of presentation – determinately or not.
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V
In his “Descriptions, Indexicals and Belief Reports,” Schiffer (1995) envisages the following scenario. A non-philosopher by  the name of ‘Stella’ says, in the context of a casual conversation about the rich and famous in the French Riviera, that (25) “Jean-Luc Godard believes that Brigitte Bardot is selling her villa in St. Tropez and moving to Liverpool.”If  the Hidden-Indexical Theory of belief reports is correct,  argues Schiffer, this would entail that Stella’s utterance of (25) contains a tacit reference to a type of propositional  mode  of  presentation  under  which  Jean  Luc  Godard  believes  the singular proposition that (26) “Brigitte Bardot is selling her villa in St. Tropez and moving to Liverpool.” Ultimately, such a propositional mode of presentation type will be comprised not only of a type of mode of presentation of Brigitte Bardot, but  also of  types of mode of presentation of the selling relation, Bardot’s villa, and the other semantic constituents of the singular proposition purportedly expressed by (26). 12The problem for HIT, of course, is that Stella is not aware of having intended to refer to any such type of mode of presentation. And if we ask her to what she meant  in uttering (25), the predictable answer is that all she ever meant to say, and thereby,  to  communicate  to  her  audience  is  that  Jean-Luc  Godard  believes  that Brigitte Bardot is selling her villa in St. Tropez and moving to Liverpool. If HIT is  correct,  belief  ascribers,  like  Stella,  are  systematically  in  error  as  regards  their communicative  intentions.  Furthermore,  there  appears   to  be  a  clear  difference between (25) as uttered by Stella, and her utterance of (3) “It’s raining”. In the latter 
12 In what follows, I shall be solely concerned with the alleged tacit reference to a type of mode of  presentation of  Brigitte  Bardot.  I  am also deliberately ignoring the way Schiffer  amends  HIT by  introducing indeterminate references to a plurality of modes of presentation types. 
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case,  but not in the former,  she will  most definitely recognize her   intention to  tacitly refer to some location or other.13According  to  Reimer,  Schiffer’s  arguments,  while  deserving  to  be  taken seriously, ultimately fail as a critique of HIT, which, to her mind, is a rather plausible theory of belief reports. Her reply to Schiffer addresses the two aspects of what she refers to as the problem of “conscious access” – the fact that belief ascribers are not aware of the allegedly tacit reference to types of modes of presentation – and  the seeming disanalogy between such tacit reference, as it is predicted by HIT, and the “paradigm cases” of tacit reference exhibited in sentences like (3). Let us start with the former problem.Her disagreement with Schiffer rests on her claim that belief ascribers may in fact recognize that they do make  tacit references to types of modes of presentation provided  such  ascribers  are  “given  suitable  prompting”  (op.  cit.  p.  411).  This possibility,  she  argues,  should  be  sufficient  to  establish  the  plausibility  of  the Hidden-Indexical  Theory.  After  all,  it  is  easy  in  philosophy  to  come  up  with equivalences such as that between (27) “All F’s are G’s” and the way such a sentence would be represented in the language of  first-order logic,  which are similarly not  the sort of equivalences that non-philosophers would immediately recognize, even though they might  come  to recognize them given suitable prompting,  say,  in the context of a logic class. The fact that such equivalences are not normally in the ken of ordinary folk hardly gives us a reason to  dismiss them.The  woman named ‘Stella’  in  Schiffer’s  example,  argues  Reimer,  could  be 
prompted to admit that she did make a reference to something very much like a type of mode of presentation of Brigitte Bardot  through her utterance of (25) “Jean-Luc 
13 Again, I am deliberately ignoring the complication introduced by the possibility that Stella might be  indeterminately referring to a number of different locations, such as St. Tropez, the French Riviera,  Southern France, and so on.
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Godard believes that Brigitte Bardot is selling her villa in St. Tropez and moving to  Liverpool”. In the fictional situation  envisaged by Reimer, Stella could have been in the company of Jean-Luc Godard while they were both   looking at an old picture of Brigitte Bardot reproduced in a tabloid. The picture,  taken   thirty years before the  present day, is of a very young and beautiful Brigitte Bardot. Underneath the picture, the  caption  reads  FAMOUS  FRENCH  BEAUTY  TO  SELL  ST.  TROPEZ  VILLA  AND MOVE TO LIVERPOOL.  It  is  a known fact to Stella  that  Jean-Luc Godard believes everything he reads in the tabloids. Under the circumstances, Stella seems to have good grounds to go on to utter  (25). Is  Stella  aware  of  having  meant  to  refer  to  anything  like  a  mode  of presentation of Brigitte Bardot? Reimer’s contention is that Stella could well come to recognize that  she did mean to communicate through her utterance of  (25)  just  what  is  predicted  by  HIT.  For  one  could  present   Stella   with  the  following hypothetical  scenario.   Jean-Luc  Godard   attends  animal  rights  meetings  in Manhattan,  meetings   which  are  also  attended  by  Brigitte  Bardot.  He  remains entirely unaware of the fact that the eccentric, middle-aged woman, known to him in this setting as ‘Brigitte Bardot’ is none other than the woman whose photograph he earlier saw in the tabloids. Even though Godard  speculates that the older woman might be the mother of the young beauty, he never suspects that they are the same person. He is under the impression that the middle-aged woman is also a resident of Manhattan. Naturally enough,   he has no reason to think that this woman is selling a villa in St. Tropez and moving to Liverpool.14It  might  then be  inquired  of  Stella  what  precisely  she  had  meant  by  her previous utterance of (25) and whether she stands by its truth. As Reimer points out,  Stella  would  likely  stand  by  what  she  had  said  earlier,  though  she  would 
14 As Reimer rightly notes, the scenario is reminiscent of Kripke’s Pierre. (Kripke, 1979)
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reformulate  her previous statement while   coming up with something like  (25)` “Jean-Luc  Godard  believes  that  Brigitte  Bardot,  whom  he  thinks  of  as  a  famous  
French beauty and actress,   is selling her villa…” Reimer’s contention is that (25)` only makes explicit what Stella had tacitly meant all along in her previous utterance of  (25). As Reimer sees it, the non-inclusion of the italicized clause in (25)` is due to the fact that, in the original context of utterance, it was obvious both to Stella and her  audience  that  Jean-Luc  Godard  thought  of  Brigitte  Bardot  in  the  way  made explicit in (25)`, so obvious, in fact, that it went without saying. On the  flipside,  if  it  is  indeed  true that  Stella’s  original  utterance of  (25) “Jean-Luc Godard believes that Brigitte Bardot is selling her villa in St. Tropez and moving to Liverpool” contains tacit  reference to mode of presentation types that Stella can become aware of with sufficient prompting, then, Reimer goes on to insist,  there would be no real  contradiction between her  earlier  insistence that  all  she meant by (25) is that Jean-Luc Godard believes that Brigitte Bardot is selling her villa  in  St.  Tropez  and  moving  to  Liverpool  and  her  subsequent   willingness  to reformulate (25) along the lines suggested by (25)`. For the latter sentence would then   express all she meant in uttering (25), though she was not initially aware that what she meant all along could be restated with such added precision.  That (25)` expresses what Stella had originally meant through her utterance of (25) can, according to Reimer, be made all the more evident if Stella, in the course of attending an animal rights meetings where Brigitte Bardot is known to everyone 
only as a middle-aged, animal rights activist, forms the resolution to communicate to her audience what she meant through her prior utterance of (25) “Jean-Luc Godard believes  that  Brigitte  Bardot  is  selling  her  villa  in  St.  Tropez  and  moving  to Liverpool.” She would presumably not repeat this very sentence, which, in the new setting, would communicate something false, namely that  Jean-Luc Godard believes that Brigitte Bardot, the animal rights activist, is selling her villa in St. Tropez and 
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moving to Liverpool. Instead, Stella would more likely than not tell her audience that Jean-Luc Godard is under the false impression that there are two women called ‘Brigitte Bardot,’ one of whom, a young French beauty, he believes is  selling her villa in St. Tropez and moving to Liverpool. Reimer concludes that Schiffer cannot be right. For if no tacit reference to mode of presentation types was included in Stella’s first utterance of (25), it should be the case that she could communicate what she meant through that very sentence in all contexts, including a context in which everyone knows Brigitte Bardot only as a middle-aged, animal rights activist.Finally,   according  to Reimer, critics of HIT are not even in a position to lay too much emphasis on the  disanalogy between the sort of tacit reference to mode of presentation  types  envisioned  by  the  HIT  theorist  in  connection  with  belief  ascription sentences and those paradigmatic cases of tacit reference exhibited by (3) “It’s raining.”  Reimer’s claim is that not all instances of paradigmatic tacit reference are immediately recognized as such by speakers. Thus, some Tucson resident  who is unaware of the reality of time zones could fail to know that  reference to mountain  
time is made through her utterance of (28) “It’s 3:10 pm.”15 After  being given a brief lecture on  time zones, this imaginary Tucson resident would come to recognize that such reference was indeed made.Although I am not persuaded by Reimer’s arguments, I believe that there is  something to be gained by considering them alongside with Schiffer’s. Reimer claims that  what Stella meant through her original use of  (25) is  given by (25)`,  where Stella’s intended meaning is made more explicit. When meaning is construed in a sufficiently  broad  way,  I  would  agree  that  there  is  some  truth  to  Reimer’s contention.  Yet,  the  sense  in  which  Reimer  may  be  said  to  be  right  in  no  way 
15 The example is again Reimer’s.
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constitutes good grounds to dismiss Schiffer’s central points. For that broader sense of meaning gives us no reason to revise the semantics of belief ascriptions.The fact that Stella, in uttering (25) “Jean-Luc Godard believes that Brigitte Bardot is selling her villa in St. Tropez and moving to Liverpool” for the first time, tacitly counts on the audience to respond to the utterance in a certain way does not  imply that the sum total of her communicative intentions is a function of the literal meaning that the above sentence has for her. We may take Stella at her word and accept her initial insistence  that all she literally meant by  (25) is that Jean-Luc  Godard believes that Brigitte Bardot is selling her villa in St. Tropez and moving to  Liverpool.” Yet, admitting this is wholly compatible with Stella’s later realization – when  presented with an imaginary context in which her words might be construed in a misleading way – that  she intended her literal use of (25) to  convey, non-literally and  contextually, what could be  more fully expressed by (25)`. This  is reminiscent of an example of Kripke’s in “Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference.” (Kripke, 1977) In the crime scene, a burglar tells another (29) “The cops are around the corner”, intending to convey to his partner something like (30) “Let’s get out of here.” Now, surely the burglar could claim that all he meant by his literal utterance of (29) was just what the sentence says. This in no way implies that he could not later come to admit that his communicative intentions were not exhausted by the literal meaning of his words. Given the facts of the case, the burglar likely wanted his partner in crime to realize that they should both leave the  scene immediately.And Stella’s  later  refusal,  in  the  context  of  the  animal  rights  meeting,   to simply repeat her earlier utterance of (25) “Jean-Luc Godard believes that Brigitte Bardot is selling her villa in St. Tropez and moving to Liverpool” need not be seen as amounting to an admission that what she literally meant by her previous utterance of (25) is not exhausted by the very words in the sentence.  Instead, Stella’s refusal 
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to  express  her  belief  in  the  same  way  as  she  had  done  before  is  a  natural  consequence  of  her  realization  that  re-using  that  very  sentence  would  be contextually inappropriate, since the audience would take her assertion to be that Jean-Luc  Godard  believes  that  Brigitte  Bardot,  the  middle-aged,  animal  rights activist is selling her villa in St. Tropez and moving to Liverpool. Furthermore, the contrast with what Reimer refers to as the “paradigmatic cases” of tacit reference is as alive as ever. For no one can say that (3) “It’s raining”  without literally intending to say that it is  raining at some particular place or other. There is no conceivable contextual or pragmatic strategy for explaining away  the sense that reference to a location is made in (3).  Interestingly,  arguments  like  Reimer’s  could  be  pushed  in  somewhat surprising  directions.  Let  us  suppose  that  Jean-Luc  Godard  knows  exactly  two women  called  ‘Brigitte  Lyotard’.  One  of  them  is  an  aged   philosopher,  who occasionally  puts  on the  mantle  of  public  intellectual  and writes  articles  for  the Riviera newspapers. The other is a young actress whom Jean-Luc considers quite untalented. On a certain occasion, Jean-Luc tells Stella, in a conversation about the philosopher, that (31) “Brigitte Lyotard is smart but not very friendly”. Days later, he tells Stella, talking about the  actress, that (32) “Brigitte Lyotard is friendly but not very smart..”  Let us suppose further that Stella is in complete agreement with Jean-Luc Godard about the two women.If Stella herself were to utter either of  (31) and (32) in a context in which the identity of the person being talked about is not totally clear to her audience, her utterances  could of course give rise to misunderstandings.  It could be enquired of her, as the case may be, “What did you mean when you said that Brigitte Lyotard is  friendly but not very smart?” or “What did you mean when you said that Brigitte Lyotard is smart but not very friendly?.”  Stella could then make her meaning clear by using some description that picks out the actress or the philosopher. 
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However,  while  her  use  of  such  identifying  descriptions  could  make  her intended meaning clear, on  some   broader sense of meaning ,  we should not, for familiar  reasons,  conclude  that  the  meaning  of  ‘Brigitte  Lyotard’,  is  given by an associated description, picking out one of the two women who go by that name. But it would seem to me that an argument such as Reimer’s, if at all valid as a criticism of Schiffer, should just as surely support a descriptivist view of proper names, which we have good reason to reject. I conclude that Reimer’s argument should be treated with suspicion.There is a lesson in Reimer’s argument, however. It does seem to show that in using sentences containing proper names – both simple and indirect –  we can  of be  held  accountable  for  the  associations  evoked  for  our  audience  by our  use  of proper  names  in  such  sentences  and  bound  to  supply  clarification  aimed  at dissipating possible misunderstandings.
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